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SOUTH CAROLINA'S EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY:
CAPITAL CHILD RAPE STATUTE PROVIDES A REMINDER
THAT SOCIETAL PROGRESSION CONTINUES
THROUGH ACTION, NOT IDLENESS
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a small child, perhaps a girl around the age of five. Assume this child
has two friends, ages seven and nine. These girls could be neighbors, schoolmates,
or even members of the same church. How the children met is immaterial-the
important observation to make is that they are close friends and play together
frequently. Now imagine that the girl's father comes home from work one day. He
is tired and moody, yet instead of retreating alone to his room, he shows a special
interest in his daughter and her friends. At first the attention seems normal-there
is nothing suspicious about a game outside followed by dinner. Then, however, the
four sit down in the living room to watch a movie, and the mood changes. The
daughter watches as her father takes her friends out of the room separately. She
notices that her friends seem fine as they leave, but upon their return, both are
noticeably upset and have been crying. Now the father summons his own daughter.
He takes her out of the room and does something that she cannot quite
describe-cannot quite understand-but she finds herself crying like her friends.
After the movie, none of the children speak to one another because each is
confused. Each girl thinks that what the adult did had to be okay, but at the same
time, each hopes never to have such an experience again. But somehow, the
experience does happen again, over and over, until finally one of the girls can keep
silent no longer. Subsequently, each of the girls finds herself being questioned by
complete strangers. Each girl finds herself in a courtroom, trying to explain what
happened but not knowing why an explanation is needed. The youngest girl
suddenly finds herself without a father, yet she does not want him ever to return.
Years later, each discovers that she is HIV positive. The victims live with their
memories, and each has a daily reminder of the horrific events in the form of a
physical disease.
Now the question becomes what should happen to this man who has
consciously stolen such innocence? In Louisiana, such a man may be sentenced to
death.' What would happen in South Carolina? Possibly the same result, as South
Carolina recently chose to follow Louisiana and permit the imposition of the death
penalty against child rapists.2 If a South Carolina jury imposed the death penalty
1. See State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1064 (La. 1996). The aforementioned scenario, while
fictional, is based on criminal charges against Patrick Dewayne Bethley. The following facts are
consistent with Bethley's conduct: Bethley was charged with raping three girls, including his daughter;
the behavior began December 1, 1995 and continued until January 10, 1996; and at the time of the
crimes, Bethley knew that he was HIV positive. Id. at 1065.
2. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-655(C)(1) (Supp. 2006).
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against a child rapist, South Carolina and Louisiana would be the only two states
to impose such a sentence.3 But is such a law constitutional, or is it a violation of
the Eighth Amendment guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment?
This Note analyzes the constitutionality of South Carolina's Sex Offender
Accountability and Protection of Minors Act of 2006.' The statute provides, under
certain circumstances, for the imposition of the death penalty against persons
previously engaging in criminal sexual conduct with a minor.5 Specifically, this
Note focuses on the provision that permits the death penalty for an actor who
engages in sexual battery with a victim who is less than eleven years of age.6
There are myriad cases that would lend merit to an examination of South
Carolina's capital child rape statute. However, three United States Supreme Court
cases are the most relevant to an analysis of the statute. Perhaps the most obvious
case to examine is Coker v. Georgia,7 as the issue in front of the Court was the
constitutionality of the death penalty for rape.8 While Coker is not precisely on
point for an analysis of a child rape statute, 9 the case lends an understanding of
possible standards that a court might reference today. Additionally, Atkins v.
Virginia"° and Roper v. Simmons" are pertinent because they are the most recent
death penalty decisions issued by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, in reference to
a punishment for which the Supreme Court has mandated "evolving standards of
decency,"' 2 a court should certainly consider the most recent standards that reflect
societal norms. In order to fully understand the implications of these cases, it is
imperative to dissect the Court's analysis in each instance.
Part II outlines the Supreme Court's analysis in Coker v. Georgia. Similarly,
Part III discusses the Supreme Court's analyses in Roper v. Simmons and Atkins v.
Virginia. Part IV subjects South Carolina's statute to a modem day reading under
Coker standards. Finally, Part V analyzes the South Carolina statute under the
Roper-Atkins line of reasoning. Ultimately, this Note concludes that in light of the
3. Georgia and Montana have rape laws not specifically drafted for child rape, but the statutes
ostensibly could support the death penalty for a conviction of child rape. See infra note 119. Florida,
Louisiana, Oklahoma, and South Carolina have statutes specifically alllowing the death penalty for a
conviction of child rape. See infra note 116. However, Louisiana is the only state that has sentenced a
child rapist to death.
4. Act No. 346, 2006 Leg., 116th Sess. (S.C. 2006). The difficulty in writing about any subject
related to the death penalty arises not from a lack of information, but from the knowledge that those
reading this Note likely read with pre-conceived notions, foregone conclusions, and personal prejudices.
This Note, however, is not intended to judge the morality of the death penalty. Instead, the assertions
discussed here rest on the notion that the United States Supreme Court has already declared the death
penalty to be one form of acceptable punishment in certain cases; the death penalty itself is not cruel
and unusual punishment when property instituted. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 591 (1977).
5. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-655(C)(1) (Supp. 2006).
6. § 16-3-665(A)(1), (C)(1).
7.433 U.S. 584 (1977).
8. See id at 592.
9. Id. (noting that the issue before the Court in Coker involved the rape of an adult woman).
10. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
11. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
12. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
[Vol. 58: 509
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most relevant precedents and current standards of decency, a reviewing court
should uphold South Carolina's new statute as constitutional.
11. COKER v. GEORGIA
The first case that is particularly on point in terms of the crime at issue is Coker
v. Georgia. 3 In Coker, the defendant escaped from prison while serving "sentences
for murder, rape, kidnapping, and aggravated assault."' 4 During the course of his
escape, the defendant committed armed robbery and other offenses, including the
rape of an adult woman. 5 Coker was convicted on a number of offenses and
sentenced to death on the rape charge.' 6 Coker asserted an Eighth Amendment
claim that the death penalty as punishment for rape was cruel and unusual
punishment.' 7 Agreeing with the defendant, the Court held that a sentence of death
for the rape of an adult woman was grossly disproportionate and excessive
punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. 8
In reaching its decision, the Court followed two lines of reasoning. The first
was that Eighth Amendment judgments should be informed primarily by objective
factors. 9 Objective factors are those measurable factors that are not based on the
subjective opinions of individual Justices and include public attitudes, "legislative
attitudes, and the response ofjuries reflected in their sentencing decisions. '2' From
the history of rape statutes, the Court inferred that both public and legislative
attitudes tended to indicate that the death penalty for rape was not considered an
acceptable punishment. 2' As the Court stated, "At no time in the last 50 years have
a majority of the States authorized death as a punishment for rape. '22 Additionally,
the response to Furman v. Georgia,23 which invalidated the majority of capital
punishment statutes throughout the United States, 24 suggested a public willingness
13. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 586.
14. Id. at 587.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 591.
17. See id. at 592. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
18. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See id. at 593-96.
22. Id at 593.
23. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
24. Coker, 433 U.S. at 593. In Furman, the defendants, who were convicted and sentenced to
death on charges of murder and rape, challenged Georgia's method of imposing capital sentences. See
Furman, 408 U.S. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring). The issue before the Court was an Eighth
Amendment challenge to Georgia's sentencing procedures, which provided no guidelines and wide
discretion for both the judge and juries during the sentencing phase. See id.at 253. The Court held that
the sentences were a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. Id. at 239-40 (per curiam). Georgia's statute led to arbitrary and capricious sentencing by
allowing thejudge orjury too much discretion in determining the sentence. See id. at 255-57 (Douglas,
J., concurring). This holding led to a nationwide legislative effort to rewrite capital sentencing statutes
2007]
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to accept the death penalty as a punishment for murder, but not as a punishment for
rape.25
The Coker Court considered jury decisions as an indicator of public opinion
because "[t]hejury... is a significant and reliable objective index of contemporary
values because it is so directly involved."26 As only Georgia and Florida allowed
execution for rape at the time of Coker, the Court focused the jury analysis on
Georgia's statistics. 27 According to factual submissions of sixty-three cases,
Georgia juries had sentenced rapists to death on six occasions in three years.28 The
Court found that a majority of juries (nine out of ten) did not impose a death
sentence on convicted rapists-a sufficient indicator of disapproval.29
In addition to objective factors like measurable public opinion, Coker also
relied on a second line of reasoning which stemmed from an Eighth Amendment
interpretation.3° "[T]he Eighth Amendment bars not only those punishments that are
'barbaric' but also those that are 'excessive' in relation to the crime committed."'"
The Court subscribed to the idea, proposed in Gregg v. Georgia,32 that "excessive"
punishment is that which is purposeless and "makes no measurable contribution to
acceptable goals of punishment," or "is grossly out of proportion to the severity of
the crime. 33 In focusing on the disproportionate element, the Court found that the
death penalty was an excessive penalty for a rapist who, as opposed to a murderer,
does not unjustifiably take a human life.34 The Court elaborated on the distinction
between murder and rape:
to satisfy the standards established in Furman. Coker, 433 U.S. at 593-94 (citing Greggv. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 179-82 (1976)).
25. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 594. After Furman, thirty-five states reinstituted the death penalty for
limited types of crimes. Id. at 593-94 (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179 n.23). No state that previously
lacked a death penalty rape statute chose to include one. Id. at 594. "Of the [sixteen] States in which
rape had been a capital offense [before Furman], only... Georgia, North Carolina, and Louisiana"
provided the death penalty for rape of an adult woman "in their revised statutes." Id.
26. Id. at 596 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976)).
27. Id. (noting that Georgia's figures were more relevant because in Florida, capital punishment
was "authorized only for the rape of children").
28. Id. at 597.
29. Id. Despite its finding that most juries disapprove of the death penalty for rapists, the Court
did admit that the six capital sentences were not negligible. Id.
30. See id. at 592.
3 1. Id. (noting that such an interpretation was found in the holdings and dicta in cases such as
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242-45 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 100 (1958); and Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 377-82 (1910)).
32. 428 U.S. at 153. Petitioner and a companion were convicted of armed robbery and murder and
sentenced to death. Id. at 158. The victims offered a ride to Gregg and his companion, who were
hitchhiking. ld at 158-59. After reaching a rest stop, Gregg shot and robbed the victims, leaving their
bodies in a ditch along the highway. d. at 158-60. The Court upheld the death sentence imposed by
the jury, claiming that the Court "may not require the legislature to select the least severe penalty
possible so long as the penalty selected is not cruelly inhumane or disproportionate to the crime
involved." Id. at 175, 207.
33. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173).
34. Id. at 598.
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[I]n terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and
to the public, [rape] does not compare with murder, which does
involve the unjustified taking of human life. Although it may be
accompanied by another crime, rape by definition does not
include the death of or even the serious injury to another person.
The murderer kills; the rapist, if no more than that, does not. Life
is over for the victim of the murderer; for the rape victim, life may
not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is not over and normally
is not beyond repair.35
The Court looked more to the result of the crime, rather than the criminal himself,
in forming its opinion.36
III. ROPER v. SIMMONS & ATK1NS V. VIRGINIA
Roper v. Simmons37 and Atkins v. Virginia38 mark the two most recent Supreme
Court decisions further defining the constitutional scope ofthe death penalty. Atkins
preceded Roper by three years, and the Court referenced the former case throughout
the latter case. 39 Roper overturned Stanford v. Kentucky40 in the same manner that
Atkins overturned Penry v. Lynaugh.4" In effect, the Court both established and
reaffirmed a more modem viewpoint via Roper and Atkins.42 As the two cases
mirror one another both in subject matter and in standards implemented by the
Court, this Part will consider them together, as parallel lines of reasoning.
In Atkins, the issue before the Court was the constitutionality of executing
individuals who are classified as mentally retarded.43 The defendant who brought
the challenge "was convicted of abduction, armed robbery, and capital murder and
[was] sentenced to death."44 Atkins and his companion, Jones, abducted the victim,
robbed him, and shot him eight times, leaving his body in an isolated area.45 The
35. Id. (footnote omitted).
36. See id.
37. 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1200 (2005) (abolishing the death penalty as punishment for juveniles under
the age of eighteen when the crime was committed).
38. 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (abolishing the death penalty as punishment for the mentally
retarded).
39. E.g., Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1189, 1191-98 (discussing the progression of death penalty
jurisprudence).
40. 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (rejecting the proposition that the Constitution bars capital
punishment for juvenile offenders younger than eighteen).
41. 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989) (holding that the Eighth Amendment did not mandate a categorical
exemption from the death penalty for mentally retarded persons). Further, "[j]ust as the Atkins Court
reconsidered the issue decided inPenry, we now reconsider the issue decided in Stanford." Roper, 125
S. Ct. at 1192.
42. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1194 (noting that the objective analysis used in Roper mirrored that
of Atkins).
43. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306-07.
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only disputed fact was the shooter's identity.46 The jury apparently found Jones's
testimony more credible and found it "sufficient to establish Atkins's guilt."
47
Atkins made no proportionality argument before but contended "that he [was]
mentally retarded and thus [could not] be sentenced to death."48 Ultimately, the
Supreme Court agreed with Atkins and held that the execution of mentally retarded
individuals is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.49
In Roper, the Court again considered the constitutionality of executing a class
of individuals-juveniles. 50 The facts that led to the defendant's conviction remain
quite disturbing. Seventeen-year-old Christopher Simmons committed murder by
breaking and entering the victim's home, tying the victim, and throwing the victim
off of a bridge.5" Prior to executing the plan, Simmons discussed it with two friends,
assuring them that "they could 'get away with it' because they were minors." 52 Nine
months after the murder and after Simmons turned eighteen, he was tried and
sentenced to death.53 Simmons brought his postconviction relief claim to the
Supreme Court after the Atkins ruling, claiming that the Court's reasoning in Atkins
established that it was unconstitutional to execute individuals who were under the
age of eighteen when the crime was committed.54 The Court agreed and held that
the execution of individuals who were under eighteen years of age at the time of
their capital crimes is prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.55
The Court's first consideration in both Atkins and Roper was to review
objective indicia of a consensus on the scope of the death penalty, as evidenced by
legislative enactments.56 The Court determined that a national consensus had
developed against the execution of the mentally retarded and juveniles.57 In Atkins,
46. See id. (noting that each defendant stated that the other defendant had actually shot and killed
the victim).
47. Id. "Highly damaging to the credibility of Atkins' testimony was its substantial inconsistency
with the statement he gave to the police upon his arrest. Jones, in contrast, had declined to make an
initial statement to the authorities." Id. at 307 n.2.
48. Id. at 310 (quoting Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d 312, 318 (Va. 2000)).
49. Id. at 321. The Court's "independent evaluation... reveal[ed] no reason to disagree" with
legislatures that have found death to be a disproportionate "punishment for a mentally retarded
criminal." Id. The execution of such criminals would not "advance the deterrent or retributive
purpose[s] of such punishment. Id. Such punishment is excessive under the Eighth Amendment in light
of "evolving standards of decency." Id. (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986)).
50. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1187 (2005).
51. Id. at 1187-88. The victim was a woman whom the defendant previously resolved to harm
after their involvement in a car accident. Id. at 1188. Simmons and his friend "tied her hands and feet
together with electrical wire, wrapped her whole face in duct tape and threw her from the bridge,
drowning her in the waters below." Id.
52. Id. at 1187.
53. Id. "As aggravating factors, the State submitted that the murder was committed for the purpose
of receiving money; was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing lawful
arrest of the defendant; and involved depravity of mind and was outrageously and wantonly vile,
horrible, and inhuman." Id. at 1188.
54. See id. at 1189.
55. Id. at 1200.
56. Id. at 1192.
57. See id- at 1192-94.
6
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the Court found unequivocal evidence that a trend against executing the mentally
retarded had developed since the Court upheld execution of such individuals in
Penry.5 8 Similarly, in Roper, the Court found the existence of a trend against
executing juveniles since the Stanford decision sixteen years earlier. 9 The Court
recognized that the abolition rate for the death penalty for the mentally retarded was
far more rapid than the concomitant rate concerning juveniles. 6° Although the rate
of change was less dramatic, the Court still found this relatively minor change to
be significant: "[I]t is not so much the number of these States that is significant, but
the consistency of the direction of change."'6 Aside from the trend, the Court also
noted that the majority of states rejected the juvenile death penalty, and even where
the penalty remained on the books, its use was infrequent.62
In a departure from complete objectivity, Atkins and Roper also returned to a
more subjective analysis by allowing the Court to exercise its independent
judgment.6 3 This analysis, first alluded to in Coker,6 4 is traceable to the idea that
"the Constitution contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be brought
to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth
Amendment. 65 In Atkins and Roper, the Court established several broad standards
under which the subjective analysis would occur. First, the Eighth Amendment
guarantees that no individual may be subjected to excessive sanctions.6 6 In other
words, justice requires "that punishment for crime should be graduated and
proportioned to [the] offense."67 Second, in evaluating the prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment, the Court subscribed to "the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. '68 Finally, because the death
penalty is the most severe form of punishment, the Court noted that it "must be
limited to those offenders who commit 'a narrow category of the most serious
crimes' and whose extreme culpability makes them 'the most deserving of
execution. "'6
58. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313-17 (2002). As the Roper Court observed, during the
thirteen-year interim between Penry and Atkins, sixteen states that previously permitted the execution
of mentally retarded persons subsequently prohibited the practice. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1193.
59. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1192-94. Five states that allowed the juvenile death penalty at the time
of Stanford had abandoned the practice by the time Roper came before the Court. Id. at 1193.
60. See id. at 1193.
61. Id. (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315).
62. Id. at 1192, 1194.
63. See id. at 1192.
64. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977).
65. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1191-92 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312). Both Atkins and Roper took
this language verbatim from Coker, thus further cementing the relationship between the three cases and
their analytical approach to death penalty issues. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 597. A completely subjective
analysis was not meant to override objective factors such as legislative attitudes and jury consensus. See
id. at 592. Rather, the subjective analysis was implemented to further substantiate objective factors. Id
66. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311.
67. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1190 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311).
68. Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)).
69. Id. at 1194 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319).
2007]
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At issue in both cases was the culpability of the defendant in light of certain
inherent characteristics: age and mental capacity. The Court differentiated mentally
retarded persons and juveniles from the standard adult defendant. In Atkins, the
Court noted a number of distinctions between the mentally retarded and adults with
normal mental capacity.7° By definition, the mentally retarded "have diminished
capacities to understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract from
mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control
impulses, and to understand the reactions of others."'" Although the mentally
retarded may still receive criminal sanctions, the aforementioned deficiencies
diminish their personal culpability as compared to other criminals.72
In Roper, the Court announced three differences between juveniles under
eighteen and adults. First, juveniles' susceptibility to immature and irresponsible
behavior indicates that their "irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible
as that of an adult."73 Second, juveniles are vulnerable, susceptible to pressure, and
lack control over their immediate surroundings. 74 Third, the character of a juvenile
is still forming.75 Because of the lack of control and vulnerability, there is more
cause for forgiveness. 76 Additionally, as ajuvenile's character is still evolving, there
is less evidence of an "irretrievably depraved character" and greater possibilities
that any deficiencies may be reformed.77
While the distinguishing characteristics were vital in both cases to establish the
level of moral culpability, the Court also found these characteristics relevant to
analyzing retribution and deterrence. The Court has qualified retribution and
deterrence as the social purposes served by the death penalty.78 As it relates to the
70. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318.
71. Id
The American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) defines mental
retardation as follows: "Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in
present functioning. It is characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual
functioning, existing concurrently with related limitations in two or more of the
following applicable adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care, home living,
social skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional
academics, leisure, and work. Mental retardation manifests before age 18."
Id. at 308 n.3 (quoting AM. ASs'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION,
CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 5 (9th ed. 1992)).
72. Seeid at 318.
73. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1195 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988)). "[A]
lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in
adults and are more understandable among the young. These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-
considered actions and decisions." Id. (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
74. See id ("[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when a
person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage." (quoting Eddings v.




78. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976). "Unless the imposition of the death penalty on
a mentally retarded person 'measurably contributes to one or both of these goals, it "is nothing more
than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering," and hence an unconstitutional
[Vol. 58: 509
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death penalty, retribution serves as "an expression of society's moral outrage at
particularly offensive conduct."79 "Indeed, the decision that capital punishment may
be the appropriate sanction in extreme cases is an expression of the community's
belief that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the
only adequate response may be the penalty of death."8 Likewise, the theory behind
capital punishment as a deterrent is that "the increased severity of the punishment
will inhibit" the criminal from carrying out the premeditated conduct.8' The
deterrent effect of the death penalty, however, is extremely difficult to evaluate and
often inconclusive.82 For example, any statistical analysis on murder would
undoubtedly have to assume that some murders result from acts of passion, for
which the preventative threat would have a minimal deterrent effect.8 3 Thus, the
deterrent effect of the death penalty is often a consideration, but it is usually not
conclusive.
In reference to retribution, Atkins proclaimed that the severity and propriety of
the punishment is directly linked to the culpability of the criminal.84 In gauging the
effect of retribution in the grand scheme of crime and punishment, the Court
remarked that "[i]f the culpability of the average murderer is insufficient to justify
the most extreme sanction available to the State, the lesser culpability of the
mentally retarded offender surely does not merit that form of retribution."85 In
Roper, the Court followed the same line of reasoning and arrived at the same
conclusion in reference to juvenile offenders: "Retribution is not proportional" if
the most severe punishment is imposed on a person whose culpability is diminished
because of inherent qualities.8 6
In Atkins, the Court found the deterrence argument to be an ineffective
justification, as the same cognitive disabilities that make the mentally retarded less
morally culpable also diminish the potential to process the possibility of execution
and, consequently, to control their conduct.87 As for juveniles, the Roper Court
came to a less determinative conclusion, finding it unclear whether the death
penalty has a significant or even measurable deterrent effect. 8  Again, certain
characteristics inherent in age make "[tlhe likelihood that the teenage offender has
made the kind of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the possibility of
execution is so remote as to be virtually nonexistent." 9
punishment."' Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,319 (2002) (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,
798 (1982)).
79. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183.
80. Id. at 184.
81. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320.
82. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 184-85.
83. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 185.
84. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319.
85. Id.
86. See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1196 (2005).
87. See 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002).
88. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1196.
89. Id. (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837 (1988)).
2007)
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IV. SOUTH CAROLINA STATUTE UNDER COKER
As set out in Part II, the Coker line of reasoning consisted of objective factors
and the Court's subjective judgment that the death penalty for rape was an
excessive punishment.9" If a constitutional challenge was brought against South
Carolina's statute and the analysis in Coker was strictly followed, a court would
likely find the statute violated the constitutional prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment. This part, however, argues that such a conclusion is problematic
because the analysis would have to rest solely on subjective factors, as the objective
factors are currently indeterminable.
A. Objective Analysis as Set Forth in Coker
A current analysis of South Carolina's statute is certainly more difficult, if not
impossible, under the objective factors. First, consider an investigation into state
and legislative attitudes. In Coker, the Court focused its objective conclusion on the
failure of the majority of states to immediately reinstate the death penalty for rape
following Furman v. Georgia, which essentially wiped out all existing death
penalty statutes.9 Such a statistical analysis is not feasible today, however, because
the Supreme Court has not since made a decision that, in effect, would invalidate
all death penalty statutes. In other words, since Furman the Court has not rendered
a holding that would redefine the parameters of capital punishment statutes.
Arguably, Coker v. Georgia redefined those parameters in terms of death
penalty rape statutes. Certainly, Coker may be interpreted as invalidating all capital
rape statutes.92 Additionally, the reenactment of rape statutes after Coker was
minimal at best. 93 Thus, the lack of immediate action by state legislatures
objectively indicates that the overall consensus rejects the death penalty as a
punishment for rape. 94
However, this argument is not so simple. Furman voided death penalty statutes
insofar as those statutes did not meet certain requirements that would ensure that
the punishment was not cruel and unusual. 95 In Furman, the Court clearly intended
not to place a ban on the death penalty but rather to force the state legislatures to
90. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
91. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g., Colin Garrett, Death Watch, CHAMPION, June 2006, at 46, 47 (noting that while the
Coker decision repeatedly referred to "adult rape," the Court frequently wrote "rape" without
qualification).
93. See id. at 47 ("The trend that the Louisiana Court anticipated has not materialized in the ten
years since Wilson, and in the almost [thirty] years since Coker, legislative attitudes have not changed
significantly or in a consistent direction."); see also James H. S. Levine, Note, Creole and Unusual
Punishment-A Tenth Anniversary Examination ofLouisiana's CapitalRape Statute, 51 VILL. L. REv.
417, 450-51 (2006) ("Ample time has passed for a trend to develop .... As such, the only possible
conclusion is that the national consensus is in favor of sparing the life of the child rapist ... .
94. See Levine, supra note 93, at 450-57.
95. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 256-57 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (invalidating
those capital punishment statutes found to impose punishment arbitrarily and capriciously).
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rewrite death penalty statutes to ensure constitutional treatment.96 Coker, on the
other hand, placed a strict ban on the death penalty for rape and left no room for
states to carry out the death penalty for the rape of an adult woman.9 7 Notably,
while Coker appeared to be narrow, it left much need for interpretation-namely
the importance of the phrase "rape of an adult woman. 98
The Court's repeated inclusion of the phrase "rape of an adult woman" in
Coker has led to two distinct interpretations which, in turn, have led to confusion
as to what action the states may constitutionally take. One interpretation is that the
Court intended to prohibit any statute that would allow the death penalty as a
punishment for rape.99 Consequently, rape simply "does not compare with murder,
which does involve the unjustified taking of human life." ' Conversely, because
the Court specifically referred to "adult rape," it may have intended to limit its
holding. The Louisiana Supreme Court has applied this interpretation as a
justification for the constitutionality of a state law that permits the death penalty for
the rape of a child under the age of twelve.' In examining a claim that the death
penalty for rape was excessive in light of the Coker decision, the court noted that
"[t]he plurality took great pains in referring only to the rape of adult women
throughout their opinion, leaving open the question of the rape of a child."'
0 2
These different interpretations of the holding in Coker left confusion as to the
validity of capital child rape statutes. Consequently, an analysis of state action since
Coker seems futile. Perhaps legislatures are still opposed to the death penalty for
child rape. Equally as likely is that ambiguity has left the states perplexed as to
whether the enactment of such a penalty is constitutional.10 3 Regardless of the
actual motivation, such ambiguity cannot lead to an objective finding of legislative
and state attitudes.
Moreover, an objective analysis of jury decisions is equally impossible under
Coker. Prior to the enactment of South Carolina's new law, Louisiana was the only
state actively implementing a death penalty punishment for child rape.1
0 4
Louisiana's statute was passed in 1995, and by 2003, juries had sentenced only one
96. See id. at 241 (affirming that the death penalty is not inherently cruel).
97. See 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
98. Id. at 593.
99. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
100. Coker, 433 U.S. at 598.
101. See State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1066 (La. 1996). The Louisiana statute upheld in
Wilson states the following: "Whoever commits the crime of aggravated rape shall be punished by life
imprisonment .... However, if the victim was under the age of twelve years,... the offender shall be
punished by death or life imprisonment...." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42(C) (1997).
102. Wilson, 685 So. 2d at 1066 (emphasis in original in bold); see also id. at 1066 n.2 (citing
fourteen instances of the use of the phrase "adult woman" in the Coker decision).
103. See id. at 1068 (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 614 (Powell, J., dissenting)). A Tennessee capital
child rape statute "was invalidated in 1977 because the death sentence was mandatory." Id. Further,
both Florida and Mississippi judicially invalidated their capital child rape statutes during the 1980s, but
only the Florida Supreme Court found Coker to be controlling. Id.
104. Id. at 1064; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (Supp. 2006).
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defendant to death for the rape of a child under twelve.' °5 The scarcity of
convictions under Louisiana's child rape statute is possibly a sign that the people
are opposed to death as a punishment for child rape. Or perhaps "the reluctance of
the juries to impose the death penalty may reflect the humane feeling that this most
irrevocable of sanctions should be reserved for extreme cases."' 6 Again, an
objective determination at this point, without more statistical information, would
appear to be premature.
B. Subjective Analysis According to Coker
In turning to a court's subjective excessive punishment analysis, the South
Carolina statute would likely fail. The crux of the Court's reasoning in Coker was
that rape does not result in the victim's death; therefore, the death penalty is
excessive punishment for such a crime.'0 7 Following such logic, there is little or no
room to argue that a court, following Coker, would allow the death penalty for the
rape of a child. However, the problem with such an analysis is twofold. First, the
death penalty is not statutorily limited to punishment for murder. 8 In 1997, of the
states that retained the death penalty, fourteen allowed the death penalty as
punishment for crimes other than murder.l°9 Thus, while the Court's reliance on the
absence of death as ajustification for invalidating the death penalty statute in Coker
seems logical, one must question the justification of such logic when a relatively
large number of crimes that do not result in death may be punished by death. While
this disparity seems illogical, in light of the language in Coker, an increase in non-
homicide capital statutes may indicate that some states may wish to increase the
105. See Chris Adams, Death Watch, CHAMPION, Nov. 2003, at 8, 8 (noting that Patrick Kennedy
received the first death sentence in the nation since 1977 for any crime other than murder).
106. Wilson, 685 So. 2d at 1067 n.6 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,388 (1972) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting)).
107. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977).
108. See Melissa Meister, Note, Murdering Innocence: The Constitutionality of Capital Child
Rape Statutes, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 197, 210-12 (2003) (discussing the post- 1993 revival of non-homicide
capital statutes).
109. Id. at 211-12; see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-51-201(c) (2005) (Arkansas: treason); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 37(a) (West 1999) (California: treason); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-1.3-401, -3-
301(2), -11-101(2) (2006) (Colorado: kidnapping where the victim is harmed, treason); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 921.142 (West Supp. 2007) (Florida: drug trafficking); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-5-44(c), -6-1(b), -11-
1(2003) (Georgia: aircraft hijacking, rape, treason); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4504 (2004) (Idaho:
kidnapping in the first degree); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/30-1(c) (2003) (Illinois: treason); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:42, 14:113 (2004 & Supp. 2006) (Louisiana: rape of child under twelve, treason);
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 97-7-67, -25-55(1) (2006) (Mississippi: treason, aircraft piracy); MO. ANN. STAT.
§§ 557.021(3)(1)(a), 565.110(2), 576.070(5), 578.310(1) (West 2006) (Missouri: treason, kidnapping,
placing bombs near bus terminals); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-303(2), -503(3)(c)(i), 46-18-220 (2005)
(Montana: aggravated assault or kidnapping while incarcerated in state prison for murder or persistent
felonies, aggravated kidnapping, rape by a repeat offender causing serious bodily injury); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 20-12-42(D) (LexisNexis 2004) (New Mexico: espionage); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-103.5 note
(2003) (Utah: noting that a 2001 amendment deleted Utah's provision allowing the death penalty for
aggravated assault while imprisoned for a first-degree felony conviction); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9.82.0 10 (West 2007) (Washington: treason).
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reach of the death penalty."' If the Supreme Court today examined a child rape
statute amidst the numerous non-homicide death penalty statues, the result, or at
least the reasoning, could differ from Coker."'
Additionally, the problem of limiting the analysis of South Carolina's statute
to Coker is that the Court has firmly established, since Trop v. Dulles'1 2 in 1958,
that death penalty cases must be evaluated according to "evolving standards of
decency."" 3 While the possibility exists that societal standards of decency are the
same today as they were when Coker was decided in 1977, such an assumption is
illogical without support. The phrase itself indicates that standards of decency are
dynamic and change along with society." 4 Thus, to examine South Carolina's
statute solely in terms of Coker v. Georgia without a consideration of more recent
implications would be an injustice to the people and legislature whose standards are
reflected in the statute.
V. SOUTH CAROLINA'S STATUTE UNDER ATKINS & ROPER
In contrast to the Coker analysis, if a constitutional challenge was brought
under the reasoning outlined in Atkins and Roper, there is great potential for a court
to find South Carolina's statute constitutional. Again, the line of reasoning set out
in these two cases initially focused on objective determinations based on evidence
of a national consensus. Additionally, the Court employed a subjective analysis of
juveniles and mentally retarded persons and evaluated implications stemming from
the retributive and deterrent effects of imposing the death penalty.
A. Objective Analysis as Set Forth in Atkins and Roper
An evaluation of South Carolina's statute under the objective standard, while
not determinative, lends support to the idea of a movement toward a national
consensus. There is evidence that a trend, or at least the beginning of a trend, has
110. See Meister, supra note 108, at 210-12 (noting that the number ofjurisdictions allowing the
death penalty for a non-homicide crime more than doubled between 1993 and 1997); see also Michael
Mello, Executing Rapists: A Reluctant Essay on the Ethics of Legal Scholarship, 4 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 129, 160-61 (1997) (noting that in 1993, at least six states authorized death for non-
homicide crimes, and by 1997, that number had grown to fourteen).
11l. Matthew Silversten, Sentencing Coker v. Georgia to Death: Capital Child Rape Statutes
Provide the Supreme Court an Opportunity to Return Meaning to the Eighth Amendment, 37 GONZ. L.
REv. 121, 164 (2002).
112. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
113. Id. at 101. The petitioner in Trop brought a claim under the Eighth Amendment, asserting
cruel and unusual punishment, after he was declared to have lost his citizenship for wartime desertion.
Id. at 87. The Court broadened its analysis in order to invoke a more general Eighth Amendment
standard. Id. at 100-01. Since the decision in 1958, Trap has stood for the proposition that the Eighth
Amendment is not static and must draw its meaning from "evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society." Id. at 101; see, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002)
(using Trop as a foundational standard for Eighth Amendment standards).
114. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01.
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been developing toward imposing the death penalty for child rapists. 15 On its face,
statistical evidence does not lend much support to this proposition; only four states
have laws specific to child rape in effect.' 16 However, other states have passed or
considered similar legislation. Since Louisiana's statute took effect in 1995,
California, Mississippi, Maryland, and Virginia have all considered bills to apply
the death penalty to people who commit sex crimes against children." 7 In 2006, the
Tennessee legislature introduced a bill to extend the death penalty to rapists of a
child younger than thirteen."' Additionally, Georgia and Montana also have capital
rape statutes, which may apply to child rapists. " 9
Based on the description of legislative efforts, one might conclude that the
defeat of legislation is indicative of opposition. However, one might also look to
the language in Roper that "[i]t is not so much the number of ... States that is
significant, but the consistency of the direction of change."' 2 ° Arguably, though
only a few states have passed the death penalty for child rapists into law, the
showing of states that have recently brought such legislation to the table is telling.
Moreover, in upholding the constitutionality of a death sentence for a child rapist,
the Louisiana Supreme Court noted that though one state may compose a minority,
its judgment is no "less worthy of deference."'1' "The needs and standards of
society change, and these changes are a result of experience and knowledge. If no
state could pass a law without other states passing the same or similar law, new
laws could never be passed."' 122 Thus, in reviewing South Carolina's statute and
other similar statutes, it seems premature to conclude that there is no national
consensus. To invalidate such a law-enacted by a legislature that is elected to
convey society's attitudes-without having convincing evidence that there is an
objective standard to follow is an overextension of judicial power. However, if
evidence emerges of clear opposition to such legislation, then a court would have
firmer ground on which to base a holding invalidating the legislation.
Turning to the next line of reasoning, both Atkins and Roper went to great
lengths to distinguish the mentally retarded and juveniles from other adult criminal
115. See Silversten, supra note 111, at 164.
116. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.01 1(2)(a) (West Supp. 2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42
(Supp. 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7115.1 (West Supp. 2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-655
(Supp. 2006); see also supra note 3.
117. See Assem. B. 35, 1999 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999) (bill died pursuant to Article IV of the
state constitution); S.B. 271, 1998 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 1998) (bill not carried over after session
adjournment); H.B. 543, 1997 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 1997) (bill died in committee); S.B. 127, 1996
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 1996) (bill reported unfavorably by committee).
118. See H.B. 2924, 104th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2006) (committee failed to recommend
passage of the bill).
119. GA. CODE. ANN. § 16-6-1(b) (2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-503(3)(c) (2005). Neither
Georgia nor Montana, however, necessarily distinguish between adult and child rape in their statutory
language. However, presumably rape in these states would include child rape.
120. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1193 (2005) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
315 (2002)).
121. See State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1069 (La. 1996) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.




South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol58/iss3/5
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
offenders. 23 Logically, the Court noted, "A central feature of death penalty
sentencing is a particular assessment of... the characteristics of the offender."'
2 4
The Court and criminal system place a certain class of criminals-those who are
found to demonstrate the greatest moral culpability-in a category potentially
deserving of the death penalty. 125 As noted, the Court found the mentally retarded
and juveniles to be less morally culpable and, therefore, less deserving of the
harshest penalty. 1
26
Why, then, should the same analysis not follow by placing the child rapist in
his own distinct category? In Coker, the Court did not focus on the character of the
accused but on the result of the crime. 121 Consequently, the Coker opinion
categorized those deserving the death penalty as murderers and consolidated all
other criminals into a broad category of criminals whose only commonality was the
absence of the act of taking a human life.'28 But what if the Court had, instead,
based the Coker decision more on the moral depravity of the rapist and less on the
actual result of the crime? Under such an analysis, it is quite possible that the
outcome, or at least the reasoning, would not have been the same. Now that capital
child rape statutes are emerging as a constitutional issue, a court should evaluate
the child rapist according to the more modem A tkins-Roper classification scheme.
Suppose the child rapist is placed in his own category and evaluated according
to the modem line of reasoning presented in Atkins and Roper. Interestingly, none
of the characteristics that exonerate the mentally retarded person or juveniles would
apply to absolve the child rapist of guilt. 129 Unlike the mentally retarded person,
whose culpability is diminished due to the lack of cognitive skills used to receive
and process information, the child rapist possesses no such quality to render him
less culpable. In fact, sex offenders who target children are unlikely to stop after
one incident. 3 ° The rate of recidivism for child molesters may reach as high as
40%, while the rate of recidivism for rapists may reach 35%. 131 Atkins does not
apply to the child rapist; the bottom line is that addiction does not fall within the
definition of mental retardation and therefore cannot render the defendant less
culpable. 1
32
In a comparative analysis under Roper, the child rapist possesses none of the
inherent characteristics that would diminish his moral culpability. The child rapist
is an adult and, as such, cannot assert vulnerability, lack of control, or developing
123. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
124. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1197.
125. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 71-72, 76-77 and accompanying text.
127. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977).
128. See id.
129. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
130. See Robert Teir & Kevin Coy, Approaches to Sexual Predators: Community Notification and
Civil Commitment, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 405, 407 (1997).
131. Michael L. AtLee, Note, Kansas v. Hendricks: Fighting for Children on the Slippery Slope,
49 MERCER L. REv. 835, 842-43 (1998).
132. See supra note 71.
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character or personal identity as an excuse.133 Juveniles lack control over their
immediate surroundings, and thus the government has a special interest in
protecting them. 3 4 The child rapist, however, is not subject to such lack of control.
"Rape of a child is an intentional crime in and of itself. One does not 'accidentally'
rape a child.' ' 135 Thus, in terms of moral culpability, there are no characteristics
considered in Atkins or Roper that would reduce the child rapist's blameworthiness
and justify the absolute prohibition of the death penalty.
The final objective analysis, as proposed in Atkins and Roper, is of the effects
of retribution and deterrence on the child rapist. In both Atkins and Roper, the very
characteristics that diminished moral culpability simultaneously lessened retribution
as a justification. 136 In reference to the child rapist, however, there are no such
innate cognitive qualities that excuse the criminal behavior. While some oppose the
retributive argument in general, the criminal system is built on the notion that
retribution is essential to maintain a moral balance: "In part, capital
punishment ... is essential in an ordered society that asks its citizens to rely on
legal processes rather than self-help to vindicate their wrongs."' 37
Insofar as deterrence is concerned, the analysis is not as clear. Opponents of the
death penalty for rapists argue that the threat will not deter the child rapist but
instead will deter the victim himself from reporting the crime.'38 As "most child
abusers are family members," concern exists that victims will not come forward for
fear they might subject the family member to the punishment of death. 3 9 The
response to this argument, as articulated by the Louisiana Supreme Court, is that
the rapist must account for his actions, and the legislature determines the
punishment. 4 ' Undoubtedly, it is difficult to gauge whether the possibility of the
death penalty will deter the child rapist. But proponents assert that the state must
protect children because they cannot protect themselves."' Thus, the state should
be proactive in taking measures that may ultimately reduce the number of child rape
cases.142 For the state to be proactive, however, the legislature must have sufficient
latitude to test and implement measures that it deems necessary. 1
43
133. See supra note 73-75 and accompanying text.
134. See State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1067 (La. 1996).
135. Id. at 1072-73.
136. See supra notes 75-86 and accompanying text.
137. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976).
138. See, e.g., Wilson, 685 So. 2d at 1073 (detailing and rejecting the defendant's arguments that
deterrence cannot be accomplished with a capital child rape statute).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1067.
142. Id. at 1073.
143. See id. ("We cannot know which among this range of possibilities is correct, but today's
holding (finding the death penalty for rape of an adult woman to be unconstitutional) forecloses the very
exploration we have said federalism was intended to offer." (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
617-18 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting))).
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B. Subjective Analysis as Set Forth in Atkins and Roper
As noted in recent Supreme Court decisions about the death penalty, the Court
has stated that the subject matter of those cases may warrant its own subjective
analysis.' The ordinary role of any court is to render a decision completely void
of the judge's personal opinion, and instead consider factors such as history,
precedent, statutory interpretation, and intent.'45 Such an analysis is almost
impossible, however, when the death penalty is at issue. The death penalty is
notoriously labeled as a "different kind of punishment" due to its irreversible
nature. 4 6 Consequently, the death penalty also demands a different kind of review.
The problem with a completely objective analysis stems from the phrase previously
mentioned: "evolving standards of decency." While the penalty itself has been both
accepted and rejected during the course of years since its implementation, the
notion of "evolving standards of decency" has remained a cornerstone in all
judgments.'47 On its face, the phrase suggests that society's standards are constantly
changing. The fact that such a phrase has been historically linked to the death
penalty suggests that the Court never intended for any judgment about the penalty
to remain static. In fact, the phrase appears to suggest that the Court invites periodic
review of the punishment.
Whether the constitutionality of the death penalty can change solely with the
passage of time is subject to debate. A proponent of strict stare decisis.4 s would
argue that the constitutionality of the death penalty is static. Because the death
144. See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
145. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 11-12 (2d ed. 2005).
146. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("The penalty of
death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree but in kind."). But see Daniel
Suleiman, Note, The Capital Punishment Exception: A Case for Constitutionalizing the Substantive
CriminalLaw, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 426,448 (2004) ("Everything that is past is irrevocable. If I kill you
in error, I have indeed done you an irrevocable injury. But so too if I imprison you falsely for five
years." (quoting JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 240 (1979))).
147. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1190 (2005) (tracing the use of "evolving
standards of decency" in death penalty jurisprudence); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002)
(noting that "evolving standards of decency" is a foundation for Eighth Amendment interpretation);
Coker, 433 U.S. at 603 (discussing "evolving standards of decency" as proclaimed by state legislatures);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (stating that "evolving standards of decency" is "oft-
quoted"); Furman, 408 U.S. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring) (discussing "evolving standards of
decency"); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (using the benchmark of "evolving standards of
decency" for the first time).
148. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1443 (8th ed. 2004).
The rule of adherence to judicial precedents finds its expression in the doctrine of
stare decisis. This doctrine is simply that, when a point or principle of law has
been once officially decided or settled by the ruling of a competent court in a case
in which it is directly and necessarily involved, it will no longer be considered as
open to examination or to a new ruling by the same tribunal, or by those which are
bound to follow its adjudications, unless it be for urgent reasons and in
exceptional cases.
Id. (quoting WILLIAM M. LILE ET AL., BRIEF MAKING AND THE USE OF LAW BOOKS 321 (Roger W.
Cooley & Charles Lesley Ames eds., 3d ed. 1914)).
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penalty itself is an irreversible punishment, a great deal of injustice could occur
from constant re-evaluation and alteration of the penalty. For example, if the
punishment is someday held to be cruel and unusual and thus prohibited by the
Constitution, those who have already been executed clearly have no room for
appeal or altemate punishment.
On the other side are some who hold what may be termed a non-originalist
viewpoint and who believe in a living Constitution that should change with
society. 49 This ideology is based on the belief that the Framers could not have
written any document comprehensive enough to guide the United States throughout
its existence. 50 The Court's approach to the death penalty applies the non-
originalist viewpoint. "The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is
nothing less than the dignity of man.... The Amendment must draw its meaning
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.
'' 1
In both Atkins and Roper, the Court used its subjective judgment in reference
to "evolving standards of decency" to significantly narrow the reach of the
punishment. In other words, the Court categorically removed two classes of
criminals-mentally retarded persons and juveniles-from the reach of the death
penalty. Though never explicitly stated, the implication follows that perhaps a more
sophisticated society finds the punishment less acceptable, thereby reducing its
applicability. This argument indicates what most death penalty opponents already
advocate-that an evolved society should eventually eradicate such a barbaric
punishment completely.'52
While this reasoning seems logical, there is an equally persuasive argument that
"evolving standards" may also support an expansion of the punishment as society
learns more about the nature of crime. While the majority of states have taken no
action in reference to child rape and the death penalty, there is a faction of states for
which this topic is clearly an issue.'53 As the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized,
"While the rape of an adult female is in itself reprehensible, the legislature has
concluded that rape becomes much more detestable when the victim is a child."' 54
In Coker, the Court repeatedly asserted that rape of an adult woman is not
punishable by death because the crime does not result in the loss of a human life.'55
Admittedly, the rape of a child does not result in physical death, but does it not
result in what may be termed a "psychological death" that is equally deserving of
punishment?' 56 The justice system seeks to punish the criminal in proportion to the
149. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 145, at 11-12.
150. See id.
151. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01.
152. See Amnesty International, http://www.amnestyusa.org/abolish/index.do (last visited Mar.
5, 2007).
153. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
154. State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1066 (La. 1996).
155. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977).
156. See id at 603 (Powell. J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("Some
victims are so grievously injured physically or psychologically that life is beyond repair.").
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act. 5 7 While the rape victim may survive, "[t]he contention that the harm caused
by a rapist is less serious than that caused by a murderer is apparently not
subscribed to by all rape victims. In some cases women have preferred death to
being raped or have preferred not to continue living after being raped."'58 Thus, as
psychologists and other professionals have published their research on the effects
of rape on a child,'59 perhaps society has become more aware of the prolonged
effects that the victim will in all likelihood suffer. Consequently, the expansion of
the death penalty to the child rapist does not necessarily indicate a regression in
societal standards, but rather a progression in the recognition of the detestability
that marks child rape.
C. Alternative Subjective Factors
The result of a subjective decision by a court is undoubtedly difficult to predict.
There are, however, other considerations not mentioned in Atkins or Roper that are
specifically relevant to this issue. A court would examine South Carolina's statute
on its face to ensure constitutional compliance. 60 Additionally, a court might
consider the statute in conjunction with Louisiana's statute, noting any similarities
and differences in the grand scheme of such punishment.
A court should examine South Carolina's statute in detail in order to make a
decision on the merits of its constitutionality. In Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme
Court held that all existing death penalty statutes were unconstitutional because
they were arbitrary and discriminatory. 16' As the Court explained, "we deal with a
system of law and ofjustice that leaves to the uncontrolled discretion of judges or
juries the determination whether defendants committing these crimes should die or
be imprisoned. Under these laws no standards govern the selection of the
157. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910) ("[I]t is a precept of justice that
punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense.").
158. State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1066 n.3 (La. 1996) (citing David J. Karp, Comment, Coker
v. Georgia: Disproportionate Punishment and the Death Penalty for Rape, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1714,
1720 (1978)).
159. See Meister, supra note 108, at 208-09 (discussing psychological effects of child rape
victims). Long-term studies indicate that "childhood sexual abuse is 'grossly intrusive in the lives of
children and is harmful to their normal psychological, emotional, and sexual development in ways
which nojust or humane society can tolerate."' Id. at 208 (quoting CHRISTOPHER BAGLEY & KATHLEEN
KING, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: THE SEARCH FOR HEALING 2 (1990)). Aside from physical side effects,
"[pisychological problems stemming from child rape include depression, insomnia, sleep disturbances,
nightmares, compulsive masturbation, loss of toilet training, sudden school failure, and unprovoked
crying." Id. at 209. "[Fleelings of guilt, poor self-esteem, [and] feelings of inferiority" may surface, and
there is an increased likelihood of "destructive behavior, . . . drug and alcohol addict[ion],
and.., suicide attempts." Id. Truly problematic is evidence suggesting that "these disturbances follow
the child into adulthood." Id.
160. See Shealy v. Doe, 370 S.C. 194,199,634 S.E.2d 45,48 (Ct. App. 2006) ("The primary rule
of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. The first question
of statutory interpretation is whether the statute's meaning is clear on its face." (citations omitted)).
161. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 256-57 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
2007]
19
Kearns: South Carolina's Evolving Standards of Decency: Capital Child Rap
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
penalty." 162 Although the Court did not set out a specific list of requirements for
death penalty statutes, it made very clear that any statute lacking specific guidance
would be declared unconstitutional. 163 South Carolina's statute appears to adhere
to the guidance given in Furman.6"
First and foremost, the statute calls for a bifurcated procedure so the question
of sentence is not considered until after the determination of guilt. 165 The Supreme
Court recommended this requirement to ensure that the evidence not allowed at trial
would not confuse the jury when the determination of life is at stake. 66 Thus, the
rules of evidence will be followed during the first part of the trial; during the
sentencing phase, other relevant information will be admitted before a sentencing
decision.167 Additionally, the statute provides a list of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances as further guidance for the jury. 168 A comprehensive list of
162. Id. at 253.
163. See supra note 24.
164. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-655(C)-(F) (Supp. 2006) (outlining circumstances and procedures
for implementing the death penalty for child rape).
165. Id. § 16-3-655(D)(1).
166. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190-92 (1976).
Jury sentencing has been considered desirable in capital cases in order "to
maintain a link between contemporary community values and the penal
system-a link without which the determination of punishment could hardly
reflect 'the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society."' But it creates special problems. Much of the information that is relevant
to the sentencing decision may have no relevance to the question of guilt, or may
even be extremely prejudicial to a fair determination of that question.
Id. at 190 (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968)).
167. See id. at 190-91 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.6 cmt. 5 (Tentative Draft No. 9,
1959)).
168. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-655(D)(2)(a)-(b) (Supp. 2006).
(a) Statutory aggravating circumstances: (i) The victim's resistance was overcome
by force. (ii) The victim was prevented from resisting the act because the actor
was armed with a dangerous weapon. (iii) The victim was prevented from
resisting the act by threats of great and immediate bodily harm, accompanied by
an apparent power to inflict bodily harm. (iv) The victim is prevented from
resisting the act because the victim suffers from a physical or mental infirmity
preventing his resistance. (v) The crime was committed by a person with a prior
conviction for murder. (vi) The offender committed the crime for himself or
another for the purpose of receiving money or a thing of monetary value. (vii) The
offender caused or directed another to commit the crime or committed the crime
as an agent or employee of another person. (vii) The crime was committed against
two or more persons by the defendant by one act, or pursuant to one scheme, or
course of conduct. (ix) The crime was committed during the commission of
burglary in any degree or kidnapping.
(b) Mitigating circumstances: (i) The defendant has no significant history of prior
criminal convictions involving the use of violence against another person. (ii) The
crime was committed while the defendant was under the influence of mental or
emotional disturbance. (iii) The defendant was an accomplice in the crime
committed by another person and his participation was relatively minor. (iv) The
defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another person. (v) The
capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. (vi)
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circumstances is another safeguard to ensure that only those criminals who are the
most deserving of the most severe form of punishment will receive a death
sentence. Thejury must find an aggravating circumstance before recommending the
death penalty.'69 Furthermore, the statute requires that "[t]he jury, if its verdict is
a recommendation of death, shall designate in writing, and signed by all members
of the jury, the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances, which it found
beyond a reasonable doubt."' 7 ° This writing requirement may also contribute to
meaningful appellate review, as the reviewing court should have no doubt as to sthe
factors the jury relied upon in reaching its decision.' 7'
Moreover, other portions of South Carolina's statute protect the defendant from
arbitrary and capricious punishment. For example, the amendment relating to
criminal sexual conduct with a minor provides for the imposition of the death
penalty only for repeat offenders.'72 Thus, the criminal will not receive the death
penalty for a first offense. Furthermore, the death penalty is only one option of
punishment. Whoever sentences the defendant, either the judge or jury, also has the
option of sentencing the defendant to life imprisonment.' Thus, the statute in no
way employs the death penalty as a mandatory punishment, but rather gives the
death penalty as an option for only the most reprehensible crimes. If there is a jury
trial and a recommendation of death, the judge has the authority to review the
proceedings before imposing the death penalty.'74 Only after the judge finds "as an
affirmative fact that the death penalty was warranted under the evidence of the case
and was not a result of prejudice, passion, or any other arbitrary factor," may he
impose the death penalty. 75 Finally, all sentences imposed pursuant to the statute
must be reviewed on the record by the Supreme Court of South Carolina.'76 The
The age or mentality of the defendant at the time of the crime. (vii) The defendant
was below the age of eighteen at the time of the crime.
Id
169. Id. § 16-3-655(D)(2).
170. Id.
171. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195.
172. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-655(C)(1).
If the person has previously been convicted of, pled guilty or nolo contendere to,
or adjudicated delinquent for first degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor
who is less than eleven years of age or a federal or out-of-state offense that would
constitute first degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor who is less than
eleven years of age, he must be punished by death or by imprisonment for life, as
provided by this section.
Id.
173. See id.
174. See id. § 16-3-655(D)(2).
175. Id.
176. Id. § 16-3-655(F)(1). In regard to the sentence, the supreme court must determine "[w]hether
the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary
factor." Id. § 16-3-655(F)(3)(a). Additionally, the court must conclude that "the evidence supports the
jury's or judge's finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance." Id. § 16-3-655(F)(3)(b). Finally, the
court must consider "[w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate ... considering
both the crime and the defendant." Id. § 16-3-655(F)(3)(c). The court is authorized to affirm the death
sentence or set it aside and remand the case for resentencing. Id. § 16-3-655(F)(5)(a)--(b). "The court
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supreme court may affirm the sentence or "set the sentence aside and remand" to
"the trial judge based on the record and argument of counsel.' 77 Thus, South
Carolina's statute has built-in measures to protect against arbitrary and capricious
execution-a factor that should weigh on the side of constitutionality. 78
In addition to examining the statute on its face, a court should consider a
comparison of South Carolina's statute to Louisiana's statute. Notably, Louisiana's
statute is far more succinct and offers fewer explicit protections for the defendant. 1
79
While Louisiana's statute offers reference to general capital punishment provisions,
the statute is not tailored specifically for those offenders who commit child rape. 80
There is no specific mention of a bifurcated trial process in Lousiana's statute.1 81
Nor is there a list of aggravating and mitigating factors that the legislature considers
pertinent to the child sex offender. 82 Unlike South Carolina, Louisiana permits a
death sentence for first offenses.'83 Furthermore, Louisiana's statute contains no
provision mandating review by the trial judge or the Louisiana Supreme Court.'84
While Louisiana's Criminal Code offers guidance so the child rape statute is not
wholly arbitrary, one must notice that the South Carolina legislature has gone to
great lengths to ensure that its statute is tailored specifically to the child rapist
defendant. The comparison of the two statutes alone, of course, in no way
determines the constitutionality of either statute; however, it is another factor for
shall render its decision on all legal errors, the factual substantiation of the verdict, and the validity of
the sentence." Id. § 16-3-655(F)(6).
177. See id. § 16-3-655(F)(5)(a)-(b).
178. See supra note 161 and accompanying text (noting that the problem with Georgia's death
penalty statute, and many others, was a lack of specificity and instruction for sentencing).
179. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42(D) (Supp. 2006).
D. (1) Whoever commits the crime of aggravated rape shall be punished by life
imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of
sentence.
(2) However, if the victim was under the age of twelve years, as provided by
Paragraph A(4) of this Section:
(a) And if the district attorney seeks a capital verdict, the offender shall be
punished by death or life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole,
probation, or suspension of sentence, in accordance with the determination of the
jury. The provisions of C.Cr.P. Art. 782 relative to cases in which punishment
may be capital shall apply.
(b) And if the district attorney does not seek a capital verdict, the offender shall
be punished by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole,
probation, or suspension of sentence. The provisions of C.Cr.P. Art. 782 relative
to cases in which punishment is necessarily confinement at hard labor shall apply.
Id.
180. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 782 (1998) (applying ajury trial provision to sentencing
for all capital crimes). "A. Cases in which punishment may be capital shall be tried by a jury of twelve
jurors, all of whom must concur to render a verdict.... B. Trial by jury may be knowingly and
intelligently waived by the defendant except in capital cases." Id.
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a court to take into consideration when forming an opinion about South Carolina's
statute.
VII. CONCLUSION
In all likelihood, the United States Supreme Court will one day face a decision
concerning the constitutionality of a statute permitting the death penalty as a
punishment for a child rapist. Whether such a challenge originates in Louisiana,
South Carolina, or some other state that has adopted a similar statute, the challenge
will come. In deciding the validity of such a challenge, the arguments on both sides
are well supported. At this point, and in light of recent Supreme Court decisions,
however, the conclusion that South Carolina's statute is unconstitutional seems
premature. Society looks to the courts to provide guidance and, above all else, a
cornerstone for justice. At the same time, the Court, in all of its wisdom, does not
operate independently of society. If, in reference to the issue at hand, a court should
find no intimation that society is pushing for a change, then surely it may employ
its power of judicial review. On the other hand, if there is any indication that
society's "evolving standards of decency" are calling for a change, then a court
should afford the people's determination the weight and consideration it deserves
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